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The role of key players, such as the employers, the state, the medical health 
bodies as well as the trade unions and labour movement has attracted much attention 
from historians, generating a contentious debate on the culpability of business, the 
success or failure of regulatory bodies and the agency of the workers and their 
organisations. For example, Bartrip contends that criticisms contained within the studies 
of the early history of occupational health have been tainted by academic ‘hindsight’ 
and has further argued that following the introduction of rules and regulations for lead 
and asbestos the statistical evidence clearly shows a decline in occupational mortality 
rates.
1
 Such assertions have not gone unchallenged with Tweedale arguing for example 
that ‘hindsight’ is not required when the ‘strikingly irresponsible actions’ of asbestos 
employers can be measured using ‘contemporary standards.’2 Greenberg and Wikeley 
have also disputed Bartrip’s assertion by claiming that the statistical evidence for 
occupational mortality was ‘seriously under-recorded.’3 This article will engage with 
such debate, focusing on the chemical industry and specifically on a case study of 
chromate manufacturing at J & J White of Rutherglen.  
Working in the chromate manufacturing process was a hazardous occupation 
with the main causes and effects being revealed in a government report as early as 1893. 
The list of physical damage experienced amongst the workforce at Whites included 
chronic dermatitis, conjunctivitis, perforation and destruction of the nasal septum as 
well as chrome ulceration.
4
 Undeniably connected to the industry, the effects of chrome 
ulceration were subject to sporadic reporting by the factory inspectorate for the next 
twenty-seven years until financial compensation was finally made available in 1920. 
For some historians this signalled a positive extension of the state into occupational 
health in the workplace. However, this article will show that compensation failed to 
prevent chrome ulceration from continuing to be a common occupational health 
problem for the Whites workforce. Although one Whites chromate worker had been 
diagnosed with occupational respiratory cancer in 1890 this particular lethal link with 
the industry was not included in the medical report of the Chemical Works Committee 
of Inquiry of 1893.
5
  Indeed, the risk of occupational cancer was not revisited until 1949 
when the Medical Research Council (MRC) embarked upon a six-year long study of the 
British chromate industry. By 1956, the MRC could reveal that ‘an excessive mortality 
                                                 
1 P. Bartrip, ‘Petticoat Pestering: the Women’s Trade Union League and Lead Poisoning in the 
Staffordshire Potteries, 1890-1914’ Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 1996 (2), p.26 and ‘Too 
Little, too late? The Home Office and the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931’ pp.421-438 in Medical 
History, 1998, (42), p.421 and p.437  
2 G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 2003), pp.277-279 
3 M. Greenberg and N. Wikeley, ‘Too little, too late? The Home Office and the Asbestos Industry 
Regulations, 1931: A Reply, pp.508-510 in Medical History, 1999 (43), p.509 
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Therein, and the Proposed Remedies by the Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry, HMSO, PP 1893, (C. 
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5 D.A. Newman, Glasgow Medical Journal, 33, (1890), pp.469-470  
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from carcinoma of the lung’ was present amongst the chromate process workers who 
toiled at Rutherglen.
6
 A series of follow-up studies demonstrated that a significantly 
high proportion of the Rutherglen workforce continued to die from cancer of the lung 
with a ‘significant excess mortality from bronchitis’ also found.7  
This article will argue that the potential impact of the rules and regulations 
designed to deal with the manufacture of chrome compounds were rendered virtually 
irrelevant by the resistance of J & J White to implement them and by the inability of the 
factory inspectorate to enforce them. Compensation was the main state and employer 
response to occupational ill health and mortality and this must be viewed as a relatively 
cheap option in comparison to the proper funding of industrial health research and the 
implementation and policing of effective preventative measures. Although the levels of 
toxic chrome dust may have been eventually reduced at Whites they were never 
eliminated and thus the workforce continued to be exposed to a contaminated and 
potentially lethal atmosphere. It will be further argued that many of the workers at 
Whites were physically damaged but never accounted for and thus became invisible 
victims of the industry. One major consequence of this invisibility was that occupational 
mortality and disease rates for Whites remained artificially low throughout the period in 
question and failed to reveal the true extent of physical damage as experienced by the 
Rutherglen workforce.  
  
Situated on the south bank of the River Clyde the firm of J & J White began the 
production of bichromate of potash in 1820 for use in the dye, tanning and pigment 
industries. By 1884 a system to manufacture bichromate of soda was added and over the 
years the firm expanded its Shawfield Works as well as the range of chrome 
compounds. Whites were the main manufacturers in Scotland although for a brief period 
they were joined by Stevenson, Carlile and Company at their Millburn Works in 
Glasgow as well as by the Eglinton Chemical Company in Irvine on the Ayrshire coast.
8
 
Whites were a family business and in 1884 John Campbell White, an evangelistic 
Christian and prominent member of the United Free Church, inherited the firm along 
with £1,900,000.
9
 He was made a peer in 1893 taking the name of his 3000-acre family 
home at Overtoun situated amongst the Kilpatrick hills far from the polluted atmosphere 
of the Shawfield Works. Lord Overtoun employed 500 men at the 20-acre works whilst 
the family connection was evident in the appointment of his nephew and cousin as 
managers.
10
 His nephew, William Chrystal, took full control of the works in 1908 
following the death of Lord Overtoun and became chairman in 1919 when the company 
assumed limited liability status.
11
 They retained their virtual monopoly in the 
manufacture of chromates across Britain largely due to the elimination of their rivals by 
                                                 
6 P.L. Bidstrup and R.A.M. Case, ‘Carcinoma of the Lung in Workmen in the Bichromates-Producing 
Industry in Great Britain’, pp.260-264 in The British Journal of Industrial Medicine, 13, (1956), p.262 
7 J.M. Davies, D.F. Easton and P.L. Bidstrup, ‘Mortality from Respiratory Cancer and Other Causes in 
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9 The Labour Leader, ‘Lord Overtoun, Chrome, Charity, Crystals and Cant’, No3 in the ‘White Slaves’ 
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the threat of, or actual, ‘price war’ tactics.12  By the mid-1920s, they had the largest 
chromate works in Britain employing around 900 men on their thirty-acre site.
13
 During 
the 1930s their output of chromates represented 70 per cent of the total British output 
and by the mid-1950s they were manufacturing sodium and potassium dichromate, 
sodium chromate, potassium and aluminium chromate, chromate acid and chromium 
oxide for use in textiles, ceramics, paints and pigments, chromium plating, 
pharmaceuticals, explosives, photographic materials, corrosion prevention and wood 
preservatives.
14
 The firm amalgamated with H.C. Fairlie & Company of Falkirk in 
1932, became a public company in 1952 and in the following year merged with 
Eaglescliffe Chemical Company. During the early 1950s the number of employees were 
reduced to 500 due to the introduction of some mechanised processes and in 1954 a 
holding company was formed in the name of British Chrome and Chemicals Limited. 
The holding company changed its name to Associated Chemical Companies Limited 
and in 1965 Albright and Wilson took over the entire operation shifting the chromate 
production to Eaglescliffe soon after.
15
 By 1967, J & J White had ceased production but 
the chromite ore processing residue that had been dumped for over one hundred years in 
the Rutherglen and Cambuslang areas would raise environmental and health concerns 
for many years thereafter when it was found to be heavily contaminated with Cr (VI), a 
known carcinogen of significant mobility.
16
   
 To manufacture chrome compounds the raw material of ferrous ore, chromite or 
chrome ironstone was dried then crushed to a fine powder before being mixed with 
limestone and the carbonate of either potassium or sodium. Once this process was 
completed the mixture was heated in a furnace at very high temperatures. The fused 
mass was then cooled, broken down and shovelled into large tanks where the chromates 
of soda or potash were dissolved out. The yellow chromate was treated with sulphuric 
acid to create bichromate and this was then evaporated in order to obtain the crystals. 
This entire process generated clouds of potash of chrome, soda, or lime dust and early 
indications were that these working conditions and processes affected the health of the 
workforce. One contemporary critic, George Mitchell, a Glasgow trade union activist, 
testified to the 1892 Royal Commission on Labour that out of five chemical factories on 
Clydeside employing 1,000-1,200 men, an estimated 75 per cent of the men worked on 
an irregular basis, not because of seasonal or cyclical demand for their labour, but 
because deteriorating health prevented regular timekeeping.
17
 Due to the absence of data 
these levels of ill health are impossible to verify but as will be shown below the findings 
of the Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry of 1893 suggest that Mitchell’s testimony 
had some validity with the damaging effects on the workforce being officially noted for 
                                                 
12 S. Checkland, ‘John Campbell White (Lord Overtoun)’, pp.293-295 in A. Slaven and S. Checkland, 
(eds) Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, Volume 1, The Staple Industries, 1860-1960, Aberdeen 
University Press, (Aberdeen 1986), p.294 
13 W. Ross Shearer, Rutherglen Lore, Story of an Eight Hundred Year-Old Burgh, 1126-1926, Alexander 
Gardner, (Paisley 1926), p.341  
14 C. A. Oakley, Scottish Industry, An Account of What Scotland Makes and Where She Makes It, The 
Scottish Council, (1953), p.208 and Scotland, Volume 1, No.6, (Special Supplement to Coincide with the 
Conference of the Chemical Society of Great Britain in Glasgow), Scottish National Development 
Council, (1935) p.12 
15 P.J. Morris and C.N. Russell, Archives of the British Chemical Industry,  
16 J.S. Geelhoed, J.C.L. Meeussen, D.G. Lumsdon, M.J. Roe, R.P. Thomas, J.G. Farmer and E. Paterson 
‘Processes determining the behaviour of chromium in chromite ore processing residue’ pp.271-279 in 
Land Contamination and Reclamation, 7, 1999 Local concerns were also raised in a series of articles in 
the Rutherglen Reformer from July 1991. 
17 C.Gill, R. Morris and J.Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants 
1978), p.33 
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the first time. Thus, reporting on the chromate manufacturers in Glasgow and 
Rutherglen the Committee stated that: 
 
The evil effects upon these workers are due to chromic acid combined with 
potash, soda, or lime. The lining membrane of the nostrils almost invariably  
suffers. Irritation of the membrane is followed by ulceration, leading 
ultimately to perforation or complete destruction of the nasal septum. These 
results cause in many cases partial or complete loss of the sense of smell. 
Similar irritation and ulceration take place in the throat, windpipe, and 
bronchial tubes. The foregoing conditions are due to the inhalation of the 
corrosive dust which is freely given off in various stages of the manufacture 
of chrome compounds.
18
 
 
Further physical damage arose when the corrosive dust settled on the skin and eyes of 
the workers which in many cases led to conjunctivitis and chronic dermatitis whilst cuts 
or abrasions of the skin were commonly followed by the formation of chrome ulcers or 
‘chrome holes.’ Chrome holes caused considerable and prolonged irritation with the 
Committee noting that they were ‘remarkable for their depth and for their slowness in 
healing.’19 
 Long hours of work heightened the risk of physical damage due to lengthy 
exposure and the Chemical Works Committee brought this matter to the governments’ 
attention. Evidence provided by another chemical firm (Brunner Mond) demonstrated 
that shortening the hours of work and introducing a three-shift pattern, lowered sickness 
rates amongst chemical workers.
20
 Aware of competition from chemical firms on the 
continent and in the USA and unwilling to impede capital accumulation the government 
failed to support the Committee’s recommendation leaving employers to adopt the 
changes on a ‘voluntary basis.’21 Imbued with the idea of what Kirk has referred to as 
‘traditionalism’ the response of the majority of employers was to retain their ‘tried and 
trusted’ methods.22 Thus, Whites maintained the status quo with Lord Overtoun 
expressing the view that if the working hours were reduced his men would simply spend 
more time in the pub.
23
 This decision meant that a typical working week for the 
Shawfield workers lasted seven days, 12 hours a day with no set meal breaks, forcing 
workers to eat what food they had in areas contaminated by chrome dust.
24
 Moreover, 
the low wages paid at Whites were unlikely to have provided for good nutrition or 
housing and the overworked men were also reliant on their own knowledge and income 
to provide self-help measures for the protection of their bodies. These measures 
consisted mainly of cloth muzzles to prevent the inhalation of dust and fumes as well as 
the use of sacking to protect their bodies. The findings of the Chemical Works 
Committee make it clear just how inadequate these self-protection measures were. 
However, not everyone agreed that the responsibility for the poor health of the workers 
lay with Whites. The main source of local news, The Rutherglen Reformer, wrote that 
the workers should have taken more care of their personal cleanliness to reduce the 
                                                 
18 Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry, p.7 
19 Ibid, p7 
20 Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry, p.5 and Appendix: Statistics, p.29 
21 The Times, January 5, 1894, p.7 
22 N. Kirk, Change Continuity and Class, Labour in British Society, 1850-1920, Manchester University 
Press, (Manchester 1998) pp.164-165 
23 The Labour Leader, ‘Lord Overtoun, Chrome, Charity, Crystals and Cant’, No3 in the ‘White Slaves’ 
series, (Glasgow 1899), p.10 
24 S. Checkland, ‘John Campbell White (Lord Overtoun)’, p.294 
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levels of illness.
25
 Whilst this ‘remedy’ may have had some ameliorative impact what 
was not explained to the readership was how this would have been possible when there 
were no bathrooms in the worker’s homes, no public baths in Rutherglen and as the 
Chemical Works Committee had noted, no baths in Shawfield Works.
26
  
Having identified the most obvious connections between chrome dust and 
disease the government introduced a set of special rules and regulations for bichromate 
works in 1893. With the dust of chromium compounds being identified as the ‘principal 
cause of the various evil results to workers’ the employers were ordered to take ‘all due 
means’ to reduce dust levels.27 In addition the rules and regulations included the 
provision of respirators, overalls, waterproof gloves and suitable sanitary conditions. It 
was also recommended that the worker’s nostrils should be stuffed with cotton wool and 
that the sponge of the respirator be soaked in a bismuth solution. If these rules and 
regulations were to have any impact they required immediate implementation and 
policing and for this to happen there was a requirement for funding. In connection with 
the implementation at J & J White the evidence would indicate that funds would have 
been available. For example, in 1893 Lord Overtoun generously chose to gift £10,000 
for the training of lay students in evangelistic work.
28
 However, any expectations of a 
similar funding being found to improve the working conditions were premature as Lord 
Overtoun’s philanthropy tended towards the saving of souls rather than the bodies of his 
workforce. Similarly, the factory inspectors who were responsible for policing the rules 
and regulations suffered from a lack of funding and in addition were hopelessly 
understaffed. By 1900, Scotland had a total of eleven factory inspectors to investigate 
more than 24,000 places of work, a ratio of 1:2200.
29
 The numbers of inspectors across 
Britain did increase but the ratio of inspector to workplace remained poor so that even 
by 1919 it stood at 1:1355.
30
 Bartrip and Fenn’s quantitative analysis of the factory 
inspectorate has shown that despite the improvements to the ratios there were no 
corresponding increases in penalty levels and no marked differences in the seriousness 
of the breaches of legislation up to the beginning of the First World War.
31
 More than 
fifty years later the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress criticised the lack 
of investment in the inspectorate with the ratio of inspector to workplace standing at 
1:1000.
32
 Thus, even by 1971 inspections were carried out every four years rather than 
annually as recommended by the International Labour Organisation. However, it is 
perhaps the nature of factory inspection rather than the quantity that should be criticised. 
                                                 
25 J & J White Archive, ‘Scrapbook’, Mitchell Library, Glasgow, TOC161 891008/13, Rutherglen 
Reformer, 14 July 1893 
26 The Labour Leader, ‘The Overtoun Horror’ No. 5 in the ‘White Slaves’ series, (Glasgow 1899), p.12 
For most of the working classes of Scotland no fixed bath was available in their homes. Therefore, 
bathing could be infrequent and usually entailed filling a tub with kettles of warm water. Even by 1951, 
43.1 per cent of all Scottish households had no fixed baths. See M. Anderson, ‘Population and Family 
Life’, pp12-47 in A. Dickson and J.H. Treble (eds) People and Society in Scotland, Volume III, 1914-
1990, John Donald Publishers, (Edinburgh 1994) p.41  
27 Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry, p.8 
28 J & J White Archive, ‘Scrapbook’, Mitchell Library, Glasgow, TOC161 891008/13, Rutherglen 
Reformer, June 1893 
29 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, PP 1901, (Cd.688), pp.516-517 
30 R. Davidson, ‘Government Administration’ pp.159-179 in C.J. Wrigley (ed) A History of British 
Industrial Relations, 1875-1914, Harvester Press, (Sussex 1982), p.177 and T.K. Djang, Factory 
Inspection in Great Britain, George Allen & Unwin, (London 1942), p.210 
31 P.W.J. Bartrip and P.T. Fenn, ‘Factory Fatalities and Regulation in Britain, 1873-1913, Explorations in 
Economic History, Volume 25, (1988), pp.60-74 
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Within Lethal Work Johnston and McIvor have identified and criticised the ‘softly, 
softly approach’ taken by the inspectorate whereby employers continued to be educated 
rather than receiving heavy fines.
33
 One consequence of this approach was that the 
relationship between the employer and inspectorate remained largely non-
confrontational throughout the period in question and, as will be shown below, allowed 
hazardous conditions to persist within the workplace.  
On 7 February 1899, three hundred men at J & J White’s works, known locally as 
‘White’s Dead Men’ or ‘White’s Canaries’ due to their bleached faces and yellow 
chrome dust covered clothing, went on strike for increased wages and improved 
conditions of work. Facing victimisation and intransigence from the employer the claim 
proved unsuccessful and the men returned to work on the 24 February.
34
  Three months 
later another claim was launched although on this occasion the men stated that they 
were not prepared to meet as individuals with their employer as during the previous 
dispute five men had been victimised because ‘they took part in the union.’35 The 
following letter was thus sent from James Reilly of the National Labourers’ Union to 
William Chrystal at J & J White: 
 
Sir, I beg to inform you that meetings of the various classes of workmen 
employed by your firm at Shawfield, other than tradesmen, were held on May 
24
th
 in Galbraith’s Hall, Rutherglen. After consideration of the conditions of 
employment at Shawfield, the following resolution was unanimously carried at 
each meeting: 
 
Resolution 
That inasmuch as our hours of labour are too long and our wages too low, we 
hereby instruct Mr. James Reilly, General Secretary of the National Labourers’ 
Union, of which we are members, to prepare and present a petition to Messrs. J 
& J White, our employers, embodying our request for: 
 
1
st
  An eight hour shift; 
2
nd
  The abolition of Sunday work; 
3
rd
  A Saturday half-holiday; 
4
th
 An increase of wages to a minimum of 6d per hour for pearl ash, 
chrome and crystal house workers, and 21/- per week for ordinary 
general labourers; 
5
th
  Weekly pays; 
6
th
  Improved sanitary arrangements; 
 
Reilly argued that the eight hour shift was achievable by replacing the two shifts 
with a three shift system and that a meal break could be accommodated for by 
allowing the labourers to attend to the furnaces. The claim to abolish Sunday 
working was made to allow the men to rest and or to attend church. These changes, 
it was claimed, could be implemented with no detrimental effect on the production 
process. Reilly further noted:  
 
                                                 
33 R. Johnston and A. McIvor, Lethal Work, A History of the Asbestos Tragedy in Scotland, Tuckwell 
Press, (East Linton 2000) p.216 
34 J & J White Archive, ‘Scrapbook’, Mitchell Library, Glasgow, TOC 161 891008/13  
35 Rutherglen Reformer, 25 May, 1900   
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Continuous working is not a necessity in such works as yours. The furnaces 
would not suffer any by being damped down on Saturday afternoon and would 
be ready for the first shift at midnight were one or two men kept on duty on 
Sunday to fire them. Considering that the rates of wages paid to labourers in 
other industries in Glasgow range from 6d. to 10d. per hour our claim for 24/- 
and 21/- per week of six days cannot be considered exorbitant when the 
exhausting and dangerous nature of our work is taken into consideration. Our 
present wage is such as will not afford a decent living.
36
   
 
Here was evidence that the continuous work process was not an essential condition for 
the production of chrome compounds but was more likely to be in keeping with 
increasing outputs and profits. Although the union had identified low wages, long hours 
of work and the two-shift system as the main issues they made no reference at this point 
to the rules and regulations that had been introduced in 1893 to deal with chrome dust. 
As McIvor has argued elsewhere employee ignorance of the rules and regulations was 
not uncommon at this juncture.
37
 In any event, J & J White rejected the unions’ claim 
stating that they could not afford to meet them. As to whether the firm could have found 
the money to meet the claims is open to debate but Whites certainly did not prioritise 
the expenditure in a period when William Chrystal spent £33,000 on a new estate at 
Loch Lomond and a further £10,000 improving it.
38
 Nonetheless, having met with no 
success the Rutherglen men turned to Keir Hardie of the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) for support. 
The ILP had taken an early interest in the development of the general labourers’ 
union movement within the chemical sector and Hardie had made contact with the 
leader of the Chemical and Copper Workers’ Union, P.J. King, at the ILP’s foundation 
conference in 1893.
39
 Indeed, it was King who had emphasised the health of the 
workers to a Royal Commission on Labour in 1892, prioritising health over wage 
increases.
40
 Hardie took the opportunity to launch a bitter attack on Lord Overtoun in a 
series of Labour Leader pamphlets that sold in their thousands. The pamphlets dealt 
with low wages and long hours of work but, unlike the National Labourers’ Union, also 
brought to the public’s attention the health hazards that continued to exist within the 
Shawfield Works. The series of exposés revealed that J & J White had largely ignored 
the rules and regulations introduced by the government in 1893 and although having 
had six years to take ‘all due means’ to reduce dust levels Whites had barely taken any 
steps at all to limit this hazard. Thus in 1899, the sheds in which the Shawfield workers 
toiled were described as having ‘a low roof, no fans, and no ventilators’ leaving high 
levels of dust to fill the atmosphere with one worker commenting ‘we are working in it, 
through it, and among it all day.’41 Respirators had been provided but they leaked and 
the firm replaced them with muslin cloths (muzzles). However, the muzzles had to be 
returned to the foreman at the end of a shift so that they could be re-issued, unwashed, 
                                                 
36 Quoted in B. Edwards, Chemicals:  Servant or Master? Life or Death? National Labour Press, (London 
945), pp.20-21  
37 A. J. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.128 
38 The Labour Leader, ‘The Overtoun Horror’ No. 5 in the ‘White Slaves’ series, (Glasgow 1899), pp.8-9 
39 D. Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888-1906, Manchester University 
Press, (Manchester 1983), p.113 
40 Royal Commission on Labour, Volume II, Group ‘C’ Textile, Clothing, Chemical, Building, and 
Miscellaneous Trades, Minutes of Evidence, PP 1892, (C. 6795), HMSO, p.395, Q.20,936  
41 The Labour Leader ‘More About Overtoun, His Defenders and Excusers’ No.4 in the ‘White Slaves’ 
series, (Glasgow 1899), p.8 
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to the next shift. So disgusted were the men that they refused to wear the muzzles and 
Whites stopped their supply forcing each worker to provide and clean his own muzzle.
42
  
As was the case in 1893, perforation and destruction of the septum as well as 
chrome ulceration were easily identified in June 1899 when Hardie employed two 
doctors to counteract Lord Overtoun’s supporters who claimed that the men were 
exaggerating. One Overtoun supporter, the secretary of the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA), stated that destruction of the septum was unknown and that the 
atmosphere in Shawfield Works was similar to that of an open field.
43
 However, James 
Erskine, a specialist in diseases of the ear, nose and throat and lecturer in aural surgery 
at Anderson’s College, found that all of the workers examined suffered from partial or 
complete destruction of the septum. In addition chrome ulceration and dermatitis were 
found on the hands, fingers, arms and backs of the workers examined. One worker at 
Shawfield was reported to have a multitude of chrome holes and had to have a wire cage 
built to prevent his shirt or trousers rubbing against the ulcers on his body.
44
 The 
doctors stated that, ‘no medical attendance is provided for the men employed at the 
Shawfield Chemical Works either to see whether the men are being affected by their 
occupation or to take care of them when so affected.’45 Once fuelled by Hardie’s 
knowledge and with the evidence of the medical experts the fledgling National 
Labourers’ Union brought the health issues and others to the Annual Meeting of the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) gaining support for the following resolution: 
 
This Congress strongly condemns the bad conditions of employment obtaining 
at the chemical works of Messrs. J & J White, Shawfield, as revealed by the 
exposures contained in the ‘White Slaves’ series of pamphlets issued by the 
Labour Leader, together with the refusal of the men’s demands for an eight-
hours day with full pay, victimisation of shop delegates, and particularly the 
dismissal of the spokesman of a deputation who recently met the manager, Mr 
Chrystal, urging the pressing necessity which exists for having the claims of the 
men conceded, and, further, that this Congress instructs the Parliamentary 
Committee to take energetic steps to have the provisions which apply to 
dangerous trades more stringently enforced in this and similar works.
46
 
 
From 1897 the STUC delegates had consistently moved resolutions that emphasised 
preventative measures over compensation and they therefore unanimously adopted the 
National Labourers’ resolution.47 The actions of the trade union and labour movement 
combined with the public scandal faced by Lord Overtoun resulted in improvements to 
the wages and hours of work as well as some improvements to the sanitary provisions.
48
  
In response to the claims that the rules and regulations were being ignored, 
Thomas Legge, a pioneer of industrial health and the first Medical Inspector of 
Factories, visited Rutherglen. His medical report of 1900 included the examinations of 
other chrome workers in Britain and noted that 83 per cent of the men had either a 
                                                 
42 Ibid, p.13 
43 Ibid, p.7 
44 Ibid, p.8 
45 The Labour Leader, ‘The Overtoun Horror’, No5 in the White Slaves Series, (Glasgow 1899), p.8  
46 Report of the Fourth Annual Scottish Trade Union Congress, April 1900, p.49 
47 See Report of the First Annual Scottish Trade Union Conference, 1897, p.16, Report of the Second  
Annual Scottish Trade Union Conference, 1898, p.9 Report of the Fourth Annual Scottish Trade Union 
Conference, 1900, p.38 
48  P. Gifford, The Chemical Industry in Glasgow, p.193 
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perforated or ulcerated septum and 22 per cent suffered from unhealed chrome holes.
49
 
Although the employers had been ordered to take all due means to reduce dust levels 
Legge noted that, ‘much dust permeates the air of the (grinding) room, no attempt 
having been made to cover in the edge runners’ whilst the breaking of crystals amidst 
‘much dust’ had become a ‘source par excellence for chrome holes.’50 The packing of 
the crystals was also ‘attended with much dust’ with ‘no attempt’ having been made to 
carry the dust away.
51
 It was further noted that sacking material was being used as a 
substitute for the overalls that were supposed to have been provided. Proper washing 
facilities were not in place and despite the improvements that had been gained the 
general sanitary provisions were viewed as inadequate. Legge amended the special rules 
for the chromate process tightening the measures for dust extraction and introduced 
monthly medical examinations.
52
 Although a register was to be kept of those examined 
the archives offered up no such documentation. Twelve months after Legge’s criticisms 
had been published Whites began a process of erecting new buildings for baths, 
lavatories, dining and cloakroom facilities.
53
  
In 1902, Thomas Oliver’s Dangerous Trades recommended that the precautions 
put in place by the German government for their chromate works should be applied to 
the British sector.
54
 This recommendation was not implemented and despite the 
tightening of the rules in 1900 chrome ulceration continued to feature in the Annual 
Reports of the Chief Inspector for Factories. By 1907, chrome ulceration was noted to 
penetrate to the bone leading to the loss of fingernails or deformity of the joints of the 
fingers. The Committee on Compensation for Industrial Diseases had no doubt that this 
damage was directly associated with the employment and argued that chrome ulceration 
be added to the schedule of industrial diseases as created by the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act of 1906.
55
 This request was turned down and in 1909 and 1911 
chrome ulceration was again highlighted in the Factory Inspector’s Reports.56 By 1913, 
failed attempts were made to develop a barrier cream to protect against the ill effects of 
chrome dust.
57
 Undoubtedly the First World War distracted attention from this 
occupational hazard but in 1920, that is 27 years after being officially informed of its 
work-related existence, the government finally agreed that chrome ulceration should 
became a notifiable industrial disease. Official data now became available for the 
number of cases of chrome ulceration and having remained the largest works 
undertaking chromate production it is at least possible to argue that the majority of the 
118 cases recorded between 1920 and 1924 would have been attributable to Whites.
58
 
Further, in 1920, draft regulations were introduced to update the existing and 
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‘inadequate’ rules and to take account of the changes that had occurred in chemical 
manufacturing.
59
 The new rules were contained in the Chemical Works Regulations of 
1922 and fully enacted in April 1923. Once again it was stipulated that, ‘an efficient 
exhaust draught’ should be provided for the grinding, sieving, evaporating or packing 
processes of chrome.
60
 A definition of ‘efficient exhaust draft’ accompanied the 
regulations making clear that it entailed ‘the provision of localised ventilation by 
mechanical or other means for the removal of gas, vapour, fume, or dust, which 
prevented it escaping into the air.’61 Protective clothing and respirators were also to be 
provided and maintained by the employer. In 1930 the Chief Inspector of Factories 
again noted that in order to reduce the number of chrome ulceration victims the 
employer had to provide localised exhaust ventilation, suitable protective clothing and 
to treat cuts and abrasions promptly.
62
 The official figures for chrome ulceration 
dropped significantly between 1930 and 1938 with a total of 31 cases being reported 
within the chrome-manufacturing sector. It would appear that the factory inspectorate 
and employers had now begun to successfully combat this industrial hazard. However, 
these official figures were recorded during a period when demand for chromates was 
high (due to the fashion of the time) and when chrome ulceration had risen amongst 
chrome dyers, tanners and platers.
63
 As will be demonstrated below the official figures 
for chrome ulceration amongst the manufacturing sector are suspiciously low for this 
period. 
Up to 1943 the workers at Whites had worked with hand fired furnaces and 
according to Davies et al this would have meant that exposure to chrome dust would 
have been ‘especially high.’64 From 1943 to 1947 Whites spent £300,000 replacing the 
old plant with rotary kilns and although this may have reduced dust and therefore 
exposure levels the aim of the firms investment is perhaps best summed up in their 
claim that, ‘the results of this reconstruction first began to show in the profits for 
1946.’65 Indeed, profits for the firm between 1946 and 1950 amounted to £728,675 with 
a 10 to 15 per cent dividend being paid to shareholders.
66
 Despite the process changes, 
103, 60, 63, and 128 Rutherglen men were affected by chrome ulceration between 1957 
and 1960 from a workforce of 500.
67
 Given that exposure levels should have been lower 
in the late 1950s than in the 1920s or 1930s the data must be viewed as less than 
reliable. Indeed, Watterson noted that even by 1990 the Sheffield Occupational Health 
Project recorded more cases of chrome ulceration in one local factory than were 
officially recorded across the whole of Britain.
68
 Moreover, Richard Fitzpatrick, a 
Whites employee between 1939 and 1945, provided oral testimony that he, his brother 
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and his father had all lost their nasal septum and that chrome holes ‘were pretty 
common.’69 This former worker also testified that in the crystal house ‘there was always 
dust flying about’ whilst the furnace area had ‘nae windows’ and ‘nae ventilation 
system’ and was ‘always dusty and stoorie.’70 Richard Fitzpatrick’s memories of the 
‘stoorie’ atmosphere are confirmed not only by the reports of the factory inspectorate 
but also by the results of an environmental study of the chromate industry conducted by 
the Medical Research Council in 1951. Therein, it was noted that ‘perforation of the 
nasal septum appeared to be common’ with the concentration of chromium in the dust 
laden atmosphere being 327 to 550 times higher (3.27 mg./cu.m. and 5.5 m.g./cu.m) 
than the maximum allowable concentration (0.1 mg./cu.m.).
71
 Again, it should be 
emphasised that this scientific evidence was produced twenty years after the levels of 
chrome ulceration had allegedly been reduced. Photographic evidence provided by 
Richard Fitzpatrick also shows that the Whites men who worked amidst such high 
levels of chromium dust remained reliant on the cloth muzzle to prevent its inhalation. 
The environmental figures above refer to the interior of the works but not all of 
Whites workers were exposed to toxic dangers within the confines of the factory walls. 
Some raked the toxic waste on the dumping grounds and suffered terribly from chrome 
ulcers, dermatitis and the loss of the nasal septum. One former worker’s wife claimed 
that, ‘his ears wept and stuck to the pillow; his eyelids would stick together; his toes and 
feet were badly affected with ulcers, leading to amputation of his feet and he eventually 
lost both legs.’72 Indeed, this woman suffered from dermatitis herself caused by 
handling her husband’s chromate impregnated clothing prior to washing them. A 
maintenance worker reported that having been employed at Whites from 1964 to 1966 
his nasal septum had been destroyed within the first year.
73
 Another, who drove the 
dumper trucks full of chemical waste, claimed that the waste blew into his face but ‘we 
were given a wee gauze and cotton wool mask that was no good at all.’74 This man lost 
one lung due to cancer whilst three of his co-workers all died of lung cancer. Leaving 
aside the official quantitative data it is at least possible to argue that from the 1890s to 
the late 1960s chrome ulceration had persistently remained as an occupational hazard 
amongst the Rutherglen workforce. This situation prevailed despite the existence of the 
rules, regulations and the advice that had been repeatedly given by the factory 
inspectorate over this time. The introduction of workmen’s compensation from 1920 
also appeared to have had little effect in nurturing the employers to take preventative 
action as it was supposed to have done.  
Occupational diseases of the respiratory system had always been viewed as 
being much more difficult to determine. Whilst agreeing that chromate workers inhaled 
toxic dust and that some workers were susceptible to respiratory disorders medical 
opinions varied as to whether the disorders were caused solely by exposure to toxic 
substances or if they arose for other reasons. An example of this process can be seen in 
the Departmental Committee Report on Compensation for Industrial Diseases of 1907. 
They argued that bronchitis could not be included as an industrial disease as they could 
not distinguish between bronchitis of an industrial origin and bronchitis caused by some 
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other means.
75
 With no solution being actively sought that would have helped with 
diagnoses, bronchial problems continued to take their toll amongst chemical workers. 
For example, between 1949 and 1977 thirty-one Rutherglen chrome workers died from 
bronchitis, a figure described by Alderson et al as ‘a significant excess mortality.’76 
Lung cancer was identified in two German chromate workers in 1912 but the possibility 
of finding respiratory cancer amongst British chromate workers was not investigated at 
this time and even Legge, a tireless campaigner for occupational health improvements, 
refused to support such an assertion when he reported on 175 cases of chrome ulceration 
in 1922.
77
 Subsequent studies in Germany during the 1930s estimated that 3.9 per cent 
of the workers at risk since 1881 had developed respiratory cancer.
78
 By 1948, Machle 
and Gregorius reported that the proportion of deaths due to carcinoma of the respiratory 
system amongst chromate workers in the United States of America was sixteen times 
the expected proportion, levels that were confirmed in 1950 by Baetjer.
79
 In Britain, 
Bidstrup, working for the Department for Research in Industrial Medicine, a branch of 
the Medical Research Council, noted in 1948 that no mortality data or reliable 
information existed for any of the three factories making basic chromates and that some 
research should be undertaken.
80
 Three years later her report concluded that it was not 
possible to ascertain the true levels of cancer but that it was possible that there was 
‘some increase in the incidence of carcinoma of the lung in workmen employed in this 
industry.’81 Over the next five years 723 British employees were clinically examined 
and x-rayed with 500 Whites workers being included in these examinations.  
The results of the follow-up study were published in 1956 and although the three 
firms involved are not named it is clear from the report that ‘Factory II’ is Whites due to 
the numbers employed. Bidstrup and Case concluded that there was ‘an excessive 
mortality from carcinoma of the lung’ with the deaths occurring ‘disproportionately 
early.’82 It was further reported that between 1949 and 1955 ten Whites workers had 
died of carcinoma of the lung caused by exposure to chromates. Variables such as place 
of residence, social class and smoking habits were all included but these failed to 
explain the high incidence of cancer found amongst Whites workforce. Lung damage 
caused by smoking often obscures the extent of occupational respiratory damage but 
Bidstrup and Case claimed that even if all of the chromate workers had been categorised 
as ‘heavy smokers’ this would not have satisfactorily accounted for the increase in lung 
cancer found amongst the British chromate workers.
83
 The overwhelming evidence was 
that carcinoma of the lung was an occupational hazard within the chromates-producing 
industry. In response J & J White made an announcement on the 9
th
 of August 1956. It 
read as follows: 
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(The) report states that the incidence of lung cancer in our works is greater than 
the average for the male population of the country as a whole. The Company 
has decided that it is its duty to make known the results of this investigation. It 
has therefore given permission for the report to be published but we want you to 
have the facts in advance. Don’t let us get this out of perspective. There has 
been a great deal of publicity lately about the increase in lung cancer in the 
general population and its possible causes. Such publicity tends to get the 
matter out of proportion. Remember that, although the report shows that the 
incidence is higher than normal it is still a great deal less than similar hazards in 
other industries such as the oil, dyestuffs and tar industries and very much less 
than the incidence of other industrial diseases such as silicosis in coal miners 
and foundrymen and so forth and so on. So you see we have a problem, not on a 
large scale but one which must be tackled positively and decisively and not 
getting it out of proportion just as similar problems have been tackled in other 
industries. Every practicable step so far as is consistent with general medical 
knowledge has been taken and will be taken to reduce any risk. 
84
  
 
It is immediately apparent from Whites statement that the overall theme was carefully 
designed to minimise the risks that had been associated with their chromate 
manufacturing process. It is also interesting to note that Whites had the power to veto or 
allow the publication of this Medical Research Council (MRC) report. In The Social 
Function of Science, Bernal noted that the MRC was ‘extremely limited’ in that it had to 
remain a consultative body, had no power to enforce any action in relation to its 
findings, and could not unilaterally make its findings publicly known.
85
 Thus, Whites 
powerful position appears to be factual. However, Whites were either being deceitful or 
incompetent in raising the issue of increased cancer rates amongst the ‘general 
population.’ It had been acknowledged from 1906 that the only diseases recognised as 
occupational were those that were rare in the general population and common in a 
specific occupation.
86
 The 1956 report had specifically and categorically demonstrated 
that the rates of this deadly illness were linked to the occupation and therefore to J & J 
Whites.  
Whites reacted to this now irrefutable problem in the manner that they suggested 
they would, that is, they did what ‘other industries’ had done. For example, within the 
dyestuffs industry it had taken a damning report in 1954 before they began to improve 
plant design in order to reduce exposure to carcinogens.
87
 Occupational deaths in the 
dyestuffs industry continued and it was only in 1967 with the introduction of the 
Carcinogenic Substances Regulations that the ‘most suspect’ chemicals were finally 
prohibited from being used or manufactured.
88
 The coal and asbestos industries also 
reacted to unfavourable health reports by taking steps to reduce (not eliminate) harmful 
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dusts within their working environments.
89
 Thus, between 1957 and 1959 Whites 
installed new plant and a new ‘low-lime’ process. Ironically, one immediate 
consequence of the demolition work carried out to house the new processes was that old 
deposits of chrome dust in the roofing areas were disturbed and 167 men at Rutherglen 
received chrome ulcerations.
90
 Clearly the fact that such heavy deposits existed was 
evidence of the minimal efforts that had previously been expended in removing the dust 
from the atmosphere. Nonetheless, the changes made to the plant did result in a reported 
reduction of chrome ulceration amongst chrome manufacturers with the numbers of 
victims falling from 181 in 1960 to 27 by 1966.
91
 A follow-up study published in 1981 
also demonstrated that the introduction of these changes had reduced occupational 
cancer rates. The men had been divided into groups for observation with those who had 
started work before 1945 designated as ‘early’ and those joining between 1945 and 
1958 designated as ‘pre-change.’ ‘Post-change’ workers were those who started after 
1959. Amongst the early and pre-change workers at Rutherglen 109 were recorded as 
having died from carcinoma of the lung due to exposure to chromates.
92
 Amongst the 
post-change workers eight men died from the same cause. In addition to the process 
changes made in the late 1950s Whites introduced compensation payments from a 
‘special scheme’ for those who contracted carcinoma of the lung and who had worked 
‘on the chrome side long enough for its development.’93 No documents could be found 
that would indicate how much money was paid out and it is therefore impossible to 
ascertain just how much the firm thought one of their workers lives was worth.  
Whilst acknowledging that trade unions did act positively in improving health 
and safety standards Weindling has asserted that they could have done more to 
emphasise health over wage issues.
94
 This claim appears to be based on a pluralistic 
perspective of industrial relations and perhaps fails to fully acknowledge the socially 
structured limits of trade unionism. As in other sections of British industry attempts at 
union organisation in J & J White led to the dismissal of some men and even by 1913 
the workers refused to meet the employer face to face for fear of victimisation.
95
 
Sustaining membership was difficult with many leaving the firm to find better 
conditions during periods of economic upturn whilst ill health forced the unfit to seek 
lighter work elsewhere.
96
 Anti-trade union judgements, including Taff Vale (1901) and 
Osborne (1909), led to protracted political and union campaigns for their repeal. Anti-
strike legislation was contained in the Munitions of War Act (1915) and was followed 
by economic depression from 1920 leading to high unemployment and huge losses of 
trade union membership. In the post war period general unions, whose main interests 
and membership lay outside the chemical industry, came to represent the majority of 
British chemical workers such as by the Transport and General Workers Union 
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(T&GWU) from 1922 and the National Union of General and Municipal Workers 
(NUGMW) from 1924.
97
 Did this lack of immediacy have an effect? In his study of the 
chemical industry between 1900 and 1930 Haber claimed that the government 
concentrated their efforts on industries where trade unions had become increasingly 
active but the chemical industry was considered to be one of the ‘less organised 
trades.’98 The General Strike of 1926 was followed by anti-labour legislation in the 
shape of the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act (1927). Despite all of this McIvor has 
noted that during the inter-war years trade unions did manage to act as a ‘protective 
buffer against overwork and exploitation.’99 Further, Melling has argued that between 
the 1890s and 1940s there is little evidence to indicate that trade union representatives 
failed to pursue their safety campaigns in order to achieve increased compensation 
awards.
100
 Up to this point in time it is difficult to see how the trade unions could be 
fairly criticised for not emphasising health over wages. 
Full employment during World War Two, allied to the political influence 
exercised by Bevin as Minister of Labour helped the trade unions restore their national 
membership to the levels of 1920 and by the 1940s the trade union movement had 
begun to consolidate their position. According to Jones, Bevin did prioritise safety, 
health and welfare at work during this period.
101
 Bevin further anticipated that wartime 
improvements in occupational health would continue after the war. However, political 
wrangling within the Coalition government, extensive negotiations with the British 
Medical Association, and the enormous difficulties in establishing a comprehensive 
national health service led to ‘a major omission’ in the White Paper of 1944, namely, ‘a 
pledge to incorporate an occupational health service.’102 Should the trade unions have 
organised a general strike to ensure this was included? Could they have done more? It is 
axiomatic that for those who work within a capitalist system the most immediate and 
common grievances will centre predominantly on wages and not health. Trade unions 
tended to focus on wages, as they were the essential factor that would provide the funds 
to purchase food and shelter as well as helping to support the dependants of the wage 
earner. Thus, in 1950 Meiklejohn noted that: 
 
Economic employment and family considerations supersede slight deviations 
from full health … the pay packet recognizes no danger, piece-work and 
output bonus admit no hindrance, and health seldom becomes a reality until  
lost beyond recovery.
103
 
 
Dwyer’s sociological study, Life and Death at Work, has also argued that state 
intervention accompanied by compensation insurance and factory inspection resulted 
in workers (trade unions) and employers struggling within and for the alteration of 
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institutional frameworks.
104
 Thus, conflict was redirected from the workplace to the 
bureaucratic constructions of compensation and safety legislation where those with 
real social power could control the agendas. Dwyer has argued that this produced a 
social peace on issues of occupational health and safety and a pattern that was 
replicated in the USA, France, Germany and Belgium.
105
 Trade unions sought to 
amend rather than replace the basis of the economic system and so long as they did so 
they retained a usefulness for that system. Thus for Miliband, drawing on the theory of 
hegemony posited by Gramsci, trade union criticisms of the economic system would 
have led to ‘vigorous but safe controversy and debate’ that would ‘obscure and deflect 
attention from the greatest of all problems, namely that here is a social order governed 
by the search for private profit.’106 Tweedale’s Magic Mineral to Killer Dust and 
Johnston and McIvor’s Lethal Work have both identified that employers and 
government regulators failed to properly protect workers from asbestos dust. The 
explanation for this according to Tweedale, Johnston and McIvor was that, ‘profit 
was, quite clearly, being placed before workers’ health and well being.’107 A very 
similar history has been shown to have existed at J & J White of Rutherglen. The 
‘functional’ role played by the trade unions did deliver some amelioration from the 
worst excesses of industrial capitalism with various steps being taken to reduce 
working hours, improve sanitary conditions, lighting, and ventilation, as well as 
pressing for limited funding for state research on matters of occupational health. 
Preventative safety and compensation had been fought for by the trade unions but 
their relatively weak position allowed the government and employers to push them 
into the bureaucratic web of compensation legislation. Perhaps those who have 
criticised the trade union movement have to some extent based their arguments on a 
fallacy of pluralism. The power of organised labour has never managed to exceed that 
of capital and the support it receives from the state and other dominant sections of 
society.
108
  
Of the 500 men examined in the original health study 227 left Whites between 
1949 and 1956.
109
 It was known that forty-five retired and four left on health grounds 
and that none of them had carcinoma of the lung in 1956. This leaves a further 148 
workers unaccounted for who were subject to a latency period of ± 20 years for 
carcinoma of the lung caused by exposure to chrome compounds. It is therefore 
statistically possible that a percentage of these men would have died at a later date from 
occupational respiratory cancer. However, they would not have been recorded as such in 
the occupational mortality rates published by the Registrar General as these statistics 
recorded the final occupation rather than the principal one.
110
 For those who toiled prior 
to 1945 there is a complete absence of mortality data and therefore although many must 
have died due to exposure to chrome dust the true extent of occupational deaths at 
Rutherglen are unknown. Consequently, the numbers who died as a result of working at 
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Whites were artificially low and provided the firm with a record that could be used to 
favourably compare themselves with other industries. This is precisely what had 
happened in 1956 when Whites announced that the levels of respiratory cancer found 
amongst their workforce were ‘less than in other industries.’ In 1969 the Chief Inspector 
of Factories argued that, ‘the success of an enforcement policy is measured not in terms 
of numbers of prosecutions, but in real improvement in safety, health and welfare.’111 
Logically therefore the failure of an enforcement policy can be measured by the lack of 
such improvements. Despite the work that had been undertaken by the inspectorate, the 
trade union and labour movement, the industrial health inspectors and the Medical 
Research Council this paper has shown that the men at Rutherglen had continued 
working in, through and amongst a potentially lethal and damaging atmosphere at J & J 
White from 1893 until the closure of the plant in 1967.  
  
Conclusion 
The factory inspector’s reports, the oral evidence of former Whites workers 
and the environmental study of 1951 all provide proof that chrome dust levels had 
remained high at Rutherglen for most of its history despite the rules and regulations 
that had been designed to reduce them. The inability of the factory inspectorate to 
enforce the measures and the reluctance of the employer to implement them meant 
that generations of Whites workers were exposed to levels of chrome dust that were 
known to be harmful since 1893. Evidence in this paper indicates that the 
intransigence shown by Whites to make their workplace safer cannot be explained by 
a lack of funds or knowledge. From the outset Whites had understood the causes and 
effects of this dust and had agreed to the rules and regulations drawn up by the 
Chemical Works Committee in 1893. From 1900 onwards the reports of the register 
system drawn up by Legge should have further alerted Whites to the numbers of 
victims suffering from the loss of septum, chrome ulceration etc. Moreover, the 
factory inspector’s reports repeatedly informed the firm of the methods to be 
implemented to reduce dust levels and protect the workforce. 
From the 1920s, due to the irrefutable nature and persistence of chrome 
ulceration it had become a notifiable industrial disease with data being made available 
for analysis. On examination of this data it has been argued that the figures are 
suspiciously low, particularly for the 1920s and 1930s. As high dust levels were 
recorded in 1951 after the introduction of the rotary kilns then it is self evident that 
even higher levels of harmful dust would have been experienced prior to this date 
when the figures for chrome ulceration were inexplicably lower. Whilst Bartrip may 
claim this to be a case of historical hindsight it should be noted that the factory 
inspectorate and employer knew that very few steps had been taken to combat high 
chrome dust levels and yet uncritically accepted the low figures for the 1920s and 
1930s. Another explanation for the disparity in the figures may be that the employers 
or their insurers had noted the high instance of chrome ulceration and had taken steps 
to dissuade injured employees from proceeding with their compensation claims. The 
introduction of the Industrial Injuries Act of 1948 made it easier to claim and may 
account for the higher figures during the 1950s.  
Carcinoma of the lung was only ‘discovered’ as a health problem at 
Rutherglen in the mid 1950s although the evidence points to the fact that international 
scientific research was available much earlier and should have alerted the government, 
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the health inspectors and the firm, to this deadly hazard. Even so, once the British 
scientific evidence of 1956 had confirmed the earlier international findings Whites 
response appears to minimise its significance. Moreover, although a new process was 
installed that reduced (but never eliminated) the incidence of respiratory cancer 
amongst the process workers little or nothing was done for those who dealt with the 
waste materials of the process at Whites. The history of the firm indicates a drive to 
profit maximise and as Tweedale, Johnston and McIvor have argued this motivational 
factor explains the neglect, deceit, and evasion that was shown by asbestos 
manufacturers in their dealings with occupational health issues. This article has shown 
that it is at least possible to argue that a similar history existed within the chromate 
manufacturers of J & J White of Rutherglen.  
